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illumination by which to see with increased clarity what is best for those we 8erve~
those who are watching or surfing at home, those who will live with the effects ot
this merger as they seek out information and entertainment for themselves and for
their families.

Chainnan KOHL. Thank you, Senator Hatch.
Now, we tum to Mr. Pitofsky.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT PITOFSKY, FORMER CHAIRMAN,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. PITOFSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chainnan and members of the
Committee. As always, it is an unusual pleasure for me to appear
before this particular Committee.
I would like to treat this discussion a little differently. I am
going to be very brief on the question of whether this merger on
T- the surface violates the antitrust laws because on the surface it is
_ about as illegal as a merger gets to be and I would really like to
sp~nd my tfme talking about the fixes that have been proposed.
Just briefly, in something like 19 or 20 percent of the country it
is a merger to monopoly, and the statute clearly says that that
should be prevented. Nineteen States, something over 30 percent
of subscribers, have no access to cable, so it is a two-to-one merger.
In areas served by cable, it is still a three-to-two merger, and we
just had that case in the court of appeals last year when Beechnut
and Heinz tried to merge, claiming they would be better competitors. Not only did the court turn down that merger, but they said
in the long history of antitrust we can't find a single case in which
that kind of merger was allowed where there are high barriers to
entry.
So what is the fix? Well, first, the argument which I don't hear
as much today but I have heard: we will lose competition in rural
America, but that is a price you have to pay; it will prove competition in the rest of the country. Well, that flies in the face of the
plain language of the statute, which says do not allow a lessening
of competition in any section of the country. I think 20 States, 20
percent of the people here in the country, IS a section of the country. And the Supreme Court has addressed that question and they
just won't do tradeoffs like that; they don't think it is justifiable.
Second, here is the real claim: If we can merge, there will be efficiencies and those efficiencies will allow us-monopoly is more efficient than competition and will allow us to do things that competition won't allow us to do. But, you know, the main point is why
can't these two companies do it on their own?
Senator Hatch just pointed out they suddenly came up with a
way to serve 210 cities instead of 40 or 100. This merger will be
permanent if it goes through. Technology is not pennanent. These
companies have gone from 1 million subscriberR to 17 million sub- _
scribers in just 5 or 6 or 7 years. They have improved the technology of their product enormously. They deserve tremendous credit.
Why can't they do that separately? Why do they need the merger
to monopoly or duopoly to achieve those things? Several witnesses
before the FCC said, under present technology, they could serve all
these local markets today. And even if they can't today, what will
we see shortly after that, in a year, 2 years, something like that?
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Finally, there is this very unusual argument that rural America
will not be disadvantaged because there will be a national list price
and people will pay the same price in Montana or Vermont as they
will in New York .and Los Angeles. Well, first of all, there is more
to ~ompetition than list prices. What about service, subsidies, packages, improvements in technology? We are merging to monopoly.
Usually, one expects that that kind of competition will disappear
or be diminished. Also, if I lived in rural America and was told I
will have the benefit of getting the kind of prices that people are
paying for cable in urban America, I wouldn't be enthusiastic about
that.
We want competition to decide prices and terms and service. We
don't want mono~lists to do so. I can't help suggesting the following analogy. After this deal goes through, suppose the airline
companies come in here and they say all that duplication that
comes from competition; let United Airlines, American and Delta
all merge together and we will serve more cities if the three of us
are together than we can today. I mean, it is almost ludicrous, but
that is very similar to the argument that is being presented.
Finally, and briefly, I think there is more to this matter than the
welfare of consumers in urban or rural America. We have seen incredible deregulation by Congress, by the courts, and by the FCC.
Much of that is a good thing. Many of those old rules were obsolete
and outdated. But every time we get rid of one of those rules, the
argument is, yes, but antitrust is there to take care of preserving
a diversity of markets, access to those markets, diversity of ideas,
and so forth.
If antitl"Ust is asleep at the switch on a merger to monopoly,
what signal does that send to the other media companies about
what is acceptable and what can be done as long as the parties say
we won't abuse our market power and they claim that monopoly is
more efficient than competition? That is not the philosophy this
country has followed.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pitofsky follows:]
STATEM"';'NT OF ROBERT PrroFSKY, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Chainnan, Members of the Committee, as in the past I am pleased and privileged to have an opportunity to testify before this Committee. Today I will address
the question of the ap-plication of the antitrust laws to the proposed merger of
EchoStar Corporation and Hughes Electronics, the parent company of DIRECTV.
Hearings on this subject before this Committee are most timely since I believe the
proposed merger raises very important questions about the direction of antitrust enforcement in this country.
I want to disclose at the outset that I am both a Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center and Counsel to the Washington law firm of Arnold & Porter.
That law finn represents Pegasus, a distributor of direct broadcast satellite (,'nBS")
services and a company that has publicly indicated its deep interest in the competitive and economic consequences of the merf;er. Nevertheless, I appear today in my
individual capacit)' and not as a representatIVe of any corporate interest.
EchoStar and DIRECTV are today the only facilities-based providers of DBS services in the Uriited States. Between them they control all three of the Ku band orbital slots licensed by the Federal Communications Commission that provide DBS
service to the full continental United States. It seems to be commonly accepted that
no additional Ku band orbital slots are likely to be available for DBS seI"Vlce in the
foreseeable future.
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bmECTV and EchoStar are thriving companies that have -expanded their base
substantially in recent years. Between them they have a total of 16.7 million subscribers-up from less than a million subscribers in 1994. 1 The growth rate of each
company has been phenomenal-for example, iI!Just the last year, EchoStar's annual subscriber rate increased by 40% and DIRECTV's rate increased by 15%.2
Much of that growth rate has been accomplished as a result of fierce competition
between the two companies and, in parts of the country that have access to cable,
also between each comJ)any and cable. Competition between the two DBS companies
has occurred through aiscounts and dealer promotion programs, subsidized equipment, improved service and similar inducements. It is interesting that the key innovations in video programming delivery-such as on demand access to movies and
compl'f:hensivesports packages-have been driven by DBS competition between
EchoStar and DIRECTV.
I find it helpful in thinkin~ about the competitive and consumer effects of this
proposed merger to consider Its impact in different parts of the country. Today in
manr sections of the country cable television is not available. Although the merger
partIes claim that only a small percentage of homes are without access to cable,
other sources indicate that the percentage of homes without cable access might be
as high as 19%,3 In Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Mississippi, Arkansas and
Vermont, it has been reported that 40% to 50% of homes are WIthout cable access;
in Idaho, Wyoming, New Mexi~J Oklahoma, Louisiana, Missouri, Idaho, Alabal!la:
Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, Maine and Wisconsin, an estimated
30% to 40% of homes are reportedly without cable access. 4 Even in areas where
cable is available, it is often unsophisticated analog rather than digital cable and
some subscribers have demonstrated a preference for DBS service over sometimes
antiquated cable facilities.
For subscribers located in these non-cable or limited-cable areas, this proposed
deal is a merger to monopoly, with the predictable higher prices anu indifferent
quality that experience shows will follow in the wake of that level of market power.
In many rural areas, this merger does not "lessen competition," it Cl __ pletely eliminates competition.1>
I am aware of arguments that it is worthwhile to see a reduction in competition
for consumers in rural America because it will improve competition in the remaining parts of the country. Specifically, it has been argued that the combined
EchoStBr-DIRECTV will be in a better position to compete with the large cable companies. That is an argument that contradicts the {llain language of Section 7 of the
Cla~n Act which outlaws a lessenin~ of competItion "in any section of the country. 6 In one of the earliest cases reViewed by the Supreme Court after Section 7
was amended in 1950, two large banks in Philadelphia tried to justify a merger by
arguing that consumers in the local market might be disadvantaged1 but that would
be more than outweighed by the fact that the larger bank, with higner lending limits because of size, could compete with the big New York banks in loans and other
activities throughout the United States. The Court rejected what it called a concept
of "counterveiling power," explaining as follows:
"If anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in another, the lo~cal upshot would be that every
firm in an industry could without violatmg Section 7, embark on a series
of mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader."
lSee Tn re Annual Assessment of the StatU6 of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
VUko Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 157 (Jan. 14, 2002).
2Td.
3See National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) & Rural Utilities
Service (United States DeJ>artment of Agriculture), Adt'Gnced Telecommunications in Rural
America: The Chali£nge of Bringing Broailband Service to All Americans, at 19 & n.62 (April
2000).
• See Look, Up in the Sky! Big Bets on a Big Deal, New York Times, Oct. 30, 2001, at Cl.
5 Moreover, that competition lias been extremely valuable to consumers. For example, when
EchoStar entered the market in 1996, offering serious competition to DIRECTV for the first
time, DBS systems fell in price from the $600 to $800 range to $200. See Mark Robichaus, Who's
News: EchoStar Chief MU6t Build Link to Murdoch Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1997. DBS service
prices, largely as a result of direct competition between 1996 and 2000. See Tn re Impi£mentation
of Section 3 of the Cabi£ Tei£vision Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Report
on Cable Industry Prices, 16 FCC Red. 4,346 (2001).
.
8Section 7 reads as follows:
"No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, shall acquire, directly
or indirectly. the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . where in any line
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
8uch acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.~
15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added).
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Let me tum now to a second major argument offered by the sponsors of the
merger-that DBS competes in a broader market that includes cable television and the merger would strengthen DBS as a competitor of cable. 7
That whole approach is an interesting change of strategy for EchoStar since it
filed a complaint in 2000 against DIRECTV in federal court in Colorado alleging
that DBS is a relevant market, distinct from cable, and that no firm other than
EchoStar or DlRECTV was likely to enter the market because of high entry barriers. s Among the many points cited by EchoStar in arguing that DBS is a separate
product market from cable was that a significant number of DBS subscribers view
DIRECTV and EchoStar as closer substitutes than alternative sources of programming, including cable; if not constrained by EchoStar, DlRECTV could raise its
prices above the competitiVe level without experiencing a significant constraint by
cable; and DBS and/or high pO\lered DBS is superior to most cable services in several respects. 9
Contrary to EchoStar's views of just over a year and a half ago EchoStar now
asserts that DBS and cable do compete in the same market. If the merger goes
through, however, that still means that the number of significant competitors will
be reduced from three to two. Subscribers today who are dissatisfied with their
cable service have two vigorous DBS competitors to tum to but would have only one
as a result of the proposed merger.
The argument that two competitors is better than three if a strengthened number
two can compete more effectively with the market leader was advanced just a rear
ago by Heinz and Beechnut when their merger, allegedly to put them in a pOSItion
to compete more effectively with the dominant Gerber, was challenged by the Federal Trade Commission. A unanimous District of Columbia Court of Appeals enjoined the merger, noting in passing that it would be unprecedented to permit that
level of concentration:
"[There have been] no silPlificant entries in the baby food market in decades and . . . [new entry ISJ difficult and improbable. . . . As far as we can
determine, no court has ever appro"ed a merger td duopoly under similar
circumstances." 10
I suggest that the argument that it is acceptable to allow a merger to monopoly
in some parts of the country, or even that it is acceptable to allow a merger from
three firms to two where there are high barriers to entry, in order for the combined
firm to compete more effectively with the market leader, would be a major de~ar
ture from established law in this country. Moreover, there is no reason to beheve
that given their past success and present trajectory, each company, along with challenging each other, can not continue to take subscribers away from cable.
To summarize this point, if the proposed merger is permitted, it will be a merger
to monopoly in areas of the country not presently served by cable-mostly rural
America. As a result, exillting competition on price and service, programming packages and, perhaps most important, in improving technology would disappear. In
areas of the country served by cable, sources of programming would be reduced from
three to two, price competition between EchoStar and DIRECTV which has kept
prices low would disappear, and because of high entry barriers no new players are
likely to appear. Under well established antitrust pnnciples-recently_ emphasized
by a unanimous DC Court of Appeals decision blocking the BeechnuUHeinz merger
just last year-three to two mergers with high barriers to entry, and when neither
company is failing, have never been allowed under the antitrust laws.
The parties recognize the difficulty of justifying this proposed merger and therefore have asserted several addItional defenses-()ne common and the other most unusual-in an effort to justify the transaction. The common claim by sponsors of the
merger is that it will allow the combined firm to offer efficiencies to consumers and
with those efficiencies improve service. Most of the efficiencies that have been described, however, really come down to elimination of duplication and overlap. But
that is just a roundabout way of justifying the elimination of competition. Another
efficiency that I have heard mentIOned is that a broader spectrum would allow satellite carriers to offer more local TV stations in more local markets. But a consultant to the Department of Justice (and now a Pegasus consultant), Roger J. Rusch
concluded that EchoStar and DIRECTV, using currently available technology, ceuld
7 United

States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 3790 (1963).

8Complaint, EchoStar Communications Corp. v. DIRECTV Enters. Inc., Civ. Action No. 00K-212 (D. Colo., filed February 1. 2000).
9 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Request for Rule 56 Continuance to Respond to
DIRECTV Defendants' Motion for Summary Juagment.l. at 11-12, EchoS/or Communications
Corp. v. DIRECTV Enters. Inc., No. OO-K-212 lD. Colo~ Illed Nov. 6, 2000).
16Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Hl'inz Co., 246 r.3d 708, 717IDC Cir. 2001).
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each on its own, achieve the same service. l1 Other parties submitting petitions to
the FCC have reached the same conclusion. 12 Moreover, just last week the merger
parties announced that they had developed a new proposal that would allow them
to deliver local channels to all 210 markets. 13 The burden of persuasion that the
two merfling parties could not individually achieve the same services should be very
great. Fmally, even if there are cogniza61e efficiencies, the Department of Justice/
FTC Revised Merger Guidelines, issued in 1997, explained that mergers that
produce high concentration can only be justified by exceetional. substantial efficiencies, and that even such efficiencies "almost never justity a merger to monopoly
or near-monopoly." 14
There are persuasive reasons why mergers to monopoly should not be justified by
claimed effiCIencies. The law has eased on allowing efficiency justifications for mergers because it is now understood that such efficiencies could be passed on to consumers-not just pocketed by the officers and shareholders of the merging company.
But if a merger leads to monopoly or near-monopoly, there is no reason for the firms
to pass along these efficiencies since they no longer compete with each other.ll;
Finally, advocates of the proposed merger have advanced an unusual argument.
They suggest that for most of the country the combined DBS company will have to
compete with cable, and competition with cable will keep the DBS rates competitive.
They also are willing to commit not to discriminate between rates and terms offered
in cable and non-cable areas so that subscribers in rural areas, faced with a monopoly, would not have to pay monopolr. rates. I suggest that national pricin~ is no substitute for present vigorous competition. First, it leaves the government 10 the position of monitoring rates and complicated terms in every community to guard against
discrimination, a role that the government triel:! not to play in a free market economy. How would the government monitor different offers in each city in the United
States that subsidize the purchase of equipment, offer free or discounted installation, and provide promotional pricing ann introductory offers? Second, even if price
terms are worked out, that says nothing about the loss of competition in non-price
dimensions-mmpetition for programming, offers of programmmg packages, better
service and, in particular, technological competition. In a high-tech, dynamic, rapidly developing field like video pro!ll'amming delivery, competition in terms of quality and technology is particularly Important. Third, if the merger reduces competition in urban markets, and reducing competitors from three to two certainly suggests such a threat, there is little comfort in pegging prices in rural areas to what
may turn out to be less-than-competitive prices in urban areas. As noted previously,
cable prices have increased in this country 7% a year since 1996t!: and have not
declined despite the presence of two aggressive DBS providers. wny would they
come down in the future when there is only one competing provider? Should there
be much satisfaction in rural markets to know that in the future they can have the
benefit of price levels imposed on cable subscribers in urban markets in recent
years? Most important, the suggestion that mer~ers to monopoly and duopoly should
escape challenge if the merged companies promlse not to abuse their market power
is fundamentally inconsistent with U.S. antitrust enforcement. We depend on vigorous competition among rivals to produce reasonably priced and high quality products-not promises by merging ~arties or enforcement by government agencies.
The proposed merger also r81BeS issues in the merging broadband market-that
is the provision of upgraded high-speed access to the Internet. Wired broadband
technologies, such as cable and telephone connections ("DSL"), have been slow to
emerge in rural areas for many of the same reasons that these areas have limited
cable penetration. There is not sufficient demand to ensure more rapid wire develop11 Mr. RusCh filed an affidavit in support of Pegasus' opposition to the mer~er. See Affidavit
and Report of Roger J. Rusch to Pegasus Communications Corporation's Petition to Deny, In
re Consolidated Application of Echostar Cummunications Corp., General Motores Corp., Hughes
Electronics Corp., Transferors, and Echo Star Ccmmunications Corp., Transferee, For Authority
to Transfer Control (FCC, filed Feb. 4, 2002).
12See, e.g., Petition to Deny of National Association of Broadcasters, at 74-81, In re Consolidated ApplicaticJ1l of Echostar Cummunications Corp., General Motors Corp., Hughes Electronics
Corp., Transferors, and EchoStar Communications Corp., Transferee, For AUthority to Transfer
Control (FCC, Filed Feb. 4, 2002); Petition to Deny By the Nattonal Rural Telecommunications
Cooperative, at 56-60, In re Consolidated Application of Echostar Communications Corp., Gen·
eral Motors CorfJ., Hughes Electronics Corp., Transferors, and EchoStar Communications Corp.,
Transferee, For Consent For a Proposed Tronsfer of Control (FCC, Filed Feb. 4, 2002).
l3EchoStarIHughes Joint Press Release, Merged EchoStar and Hughes will D"lit'er Local
Broadca8t Channels to All 210 U.S. Telel'ision Markets !Feb. 26, 2002).
14United States Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Commission:.Revised 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, § 4 (rev. 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (ce") '113, 104.
16See Id.
16See, infra, n.5.
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ment. At least for the foreseeable future, satellite broadband service is the most
likely technology tojrovide broadband in rural America. The merger of EchoStar
and DffiECTV woul be a merger to monopoly for millions of ruraI consumers who
have no alternative to DBS for broadband Internet access as well as multi-channel
video service.
I assume the parties will argue again that they need the merger to eliminate "duplication" and thereby will be able to roll out broadband service more quickly. The
companies should certainly be pressed to explain why the mer~er is necessary to
bring out services that both DIRECTV and EchoStar have pronused consumers for
some time that each would separately provide.
CONCLUSION
We see evidence on all sides of the amazing transformation of media in this country-partly a result of advances in technology but also a consequence of deregulation
by Congress, the courts and the Federal Communications Commission. I agree that
many regulatory rules are outdated and deserve to be vacated. With respect to the
loosening of ownership restrictions, however, it is often said that antitrust is adequate to protect the market against undue concentration. Antitrust, it is argued,
would prevent adverse effects on consumer welfare and preserve a marketplace open
to a diversity of ideas.
If antitrust were to falter, media would indeed be a deregulated sector of the economy. This proposed merEer of two satellite companies, resulting in monopoly in a
substantial part of the United States and, at best, duopoly in the remainder, violates all of the established principles of merger review under the antitrust laws. If
this merger as presently structured is allowed, antitrust will have faltered. An essential condition for continued deregulation will be absent. It would send a clear sig- nal to other media companies that the net is down and almost anything goes-so
long as the sponsors of the merger claim that their monopoly is more efficient than
competition, and promise not to abuse their market power.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Pitofsky.
We turn now to Mr. Gene Kimmelman.
STATEMENT OF GENE KIMMELMAN, CO·DIRECTOR, WASH·
INGTON, D.C. OFFICE, CONSUMERS UNION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.

Mr. KIMMELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator DeWine,
Senator Hatch. On behalf of Consumers llnion, the online and
print publisher of Consumer Reports, I appreciate the opportunity
to testify once again.
A!3 you know better than anyone, I believe no one has come be·
fore this Committee more often in the last 4 years to complain
about consolidation and concentration of control in the media and
telecommunications markets. And I could do this one exactly the
same way, and both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Pitofsky make important
antitrust points, and but I believe it would be more fruitful today
to view this merger from a much broader perspective than just
antitrust, but I will include antitrust.
For about 90 percent of consumers, the problem with television
is cable monopoly. I appreciate that you have asked the GAO to
study the impact of local broadcast channels added to satellite competing versus cable. We have looked at that and we will talk to the
GAO, and the answer is quite clear and we have outlined it in
great detail in our testimony. These are predominantly separate
markets.
Even with local broadcasts, you have cable rates up 36 percent
since 1996, when the Telecom Act was passed, and just since January of this year, from Seattle, to Los Angeles, to Reno, to Austin,
to St. Louis, to Memphis, to Atlanta, to Syracuse, to Boston, double-digit cable rate increases. Most of those communities have sat·
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Response of Robert Pitofsky to a question submitted by Senator Edward
.
Kennedy
Question: What impact, if any, would approval of the J;'roposed merger have on
efforts to bri~e the digital diVIue by providing greater high speed internet access
to underserved" urban and rural communitie.1?
Answer: For many communities in the United States without access to cable or
DSL, satellite broadband is the most likely vption for the foreseeable future for their
obtaining high-speed Internet access. I have seen no indication, however, that this
merger is necessary to increase the availability of such satellite broadband services.
Subsidiaries of both EchoStar and DirecTV are currently providing those services
and have announced plans to expand those services. Consumers would be better off
with two providers of satellite broadband services rather than one .

•
Responses of Robert Pitofsky to questions submitted by Senator Strom
.
Thurmond
Question 1: Mr. Pitofsky, assuming that a merger between EchoStar and Hughes
DIRECTV would result in enhanced competition between satellite and cable services
in the shortrun, what will he the long-term effects on competition in the multi-channel video programming market? Are any short-term benefits worth the long-term
risks? If the merger takes place, how can we be assured that a competitive market
will exist ten years from now?
Answer: EchoStar and DirecTV have been doing very well on their own in competing against cable services. They claim they cannot be effective in their competition with digital cable without a merger, but it is hard to see why that would he
true. Their record of SUCCP.RS over the last six years undermines that argument. AJJ
a result, even in the short term, there is every reason to believe that existing competition between the two satellite ,eroviders will continue to serve consumers well.
With respect to the long term, If the me~er is permitted, it is permanent. We
could see a sin~le satellite company dominatlll~ consumer services III this area for
a long time-with the indifferent service and higher prices that high levels of market power usually produce.
Question 2: Mr. Pitofsky, it has been suggested that the u one nation, one rate
card" will protect rural markets where cable services are not available, thereby preventing the new corporation from abusing its monopoly in multi-channel video programming in those areas. However, if a cable prOVIder in a metropolitan area cuts
prices drastically, the new corporation would oe unable to lower the rates in that
metropolitan area without lowering rates everywhere in the nation. Therefore, while
rural areas would be protected, the new company would be unable to compete in
the metropolitan areas where cable cuts its rates. If this merger is approved, won't
the concept of "one nation, one rate card" be a hindrance to vibrant competition in
some markets?
Answer: I believe the premise of your question is exactly right. The concept of a
national rate card seems appealing only so long as one does not carefully examine
the consequences. If there is a single rate card and a cable company were to cut
prices in a particular area, the merged firm will only he able to meet those prices
If it lowered its national rate card across the entire country. That is unlikely to happen. Also, the concept that competition comes in a sin~Ie fonn-a single national
rate card-is not consistent witli experience. The satelhte companies have aggressively competed with each other through new subscriber promotions, eguipment discounts, ana other incentives. Thus, even if the rates in rural areas where the combined company would have a monopoly were the same as elsewhere in the United
States, the rural areas could be denied all of these inducements and concessions
that have been so important in the DBS industry. Nor will a national rate card substitute for the loss in competition to offer new services and technological innovation.
There is also the question of who will monitor this unusual commitment by the
merged finns. One possibility is just to take their word for it, but antitrust enforcement doesn't usually work that way. The alternative is for a government agener. to
monitor each and every tenn of sale in each and every community in the Uruted
States to ensure that the ~one nation, one rate card" concept is bein~ respected.
That is a form of direct and intrusive government regulation in the media area that
Congress, the FCC, and the courts have been trying to avoid.
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Questwn 3: Mr. Pitofsky, if the Department of Justice were to approve the merger,
what ldnd of safeguards should be implemented to ensure that pnces are kept constant in those rural areas without access to cable? Can these safeguards be effective?
Answer: liB I said in my yrevious answer, the kind of monitoring that would be
required may be impractica and ineffective, and certainly is inconsistent with the
general thrust of antitrust law in relying on the free market to ensure fair and nondiscriminatory prices.
Questwn 4: Mr. Pitofsky, what safeguards are necessary to prevent the new corporation from requiring consumers to erect two dishes so that they may receive local
channels? Would these safeguards be effective? If two dishes were eventually required, would many local channels be relegated to second-class status?
Answer: The question raises the very legitimate concern that the merger may
produce inefficiencies in the way DBS service is provided. I don't have the technical
expertise to know whether it will be necessary for consumers to purchase and own
two satellite dishes rather than one, but the main point is that either of these companies separately could provide local TV channels. They are doing it now, and they
are expanding. I see r.o reason why a merger is necessary to achieve that service--assummg willing consumers are available to purchase the service.
Questwn 5: Mr. Pitofsky, will the concentration of all the satellite spectrum in one
company be a benefit or a detriment to consumers?
Answer: The theory of antitrust in this country for over 100 years is·that monopoly market power in the long run is bad for consumers. That is particularly true
where the market is barricaded by high entry barriers so that, if the monopolist
raises prices or reduces service, others cannot enter. That is the situation that consumers would face if the proposed merger goes through.
Questwn 6: Mr. Pitofsky, are satellite services currently competitive with digital
cable services? If so, does this undercut the argument that the merger is necessary
for satellite to be competitive with cable?
Answer: I believe that satellite services are currently competitive with digital
cable services in terms of the number of channels, quality of reception, advancp.d
services that can be available to consumers and other features. Even if that were
not true, this is an exceptionally dynamic sector of the economy, and services are
modified and improved constantly. The real threat to continued competition would
occur if EchoStar and DirecTV were permitted to merge so that they would amount
to a satellite monopoly. Then the rivalry between the two, which has led to such
obvious success in dramatic subscriber growth and expansion and enhancement of
service in recent years, would disappear.
Question 7: Mr. Pitofsky, a guiding principle in American antitrust foHCY is the
effect of a proposed merger on the consumer. How will the consumer 0 multi-channel video programming be affected by a merger between EchoStar and Hughes
DirecTV?
Answer; It is the most fundamental tenet of American antitrust enforcement that
mergers to monopoly (or even duop'oly) will lead to higher prices, poorer service, and
less innovation than would occur If there were competition. Congress and the courts
have never wavered from their commitment to a free market protected by competition. I understand that the shareholders of the two companies proposing to merge
might be enriched, but I simply can't see how consumers would be any better off.

Responses of Robert Pitofsky to questions submitted by Senator Herbert
Kohl
l. Mr. Pitofsky, in most markets, the EchoStarlDIRECTV merger will reduce the
number of competitors for subscription TV from three-the local cable TV company
and the two satellite companies-to two. In rural areas not served by cable, the reduction to competition will be even worse-from two to one. Can you identitY any
merger in which a reduction in the number of competitors from three to two benefited consumers?
Answer: I cannot. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia could
not in the proposed merger of Beech Nut and Heinz, where it said it could not find
a single case In which a merger of three to two under similar circumstances was
permitted by a court. The result might be different if one of the two companies were
failing or if barriers to entry into the market in which they operated were extremely
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low. Neither of those factors is present in connection with the proposed EchoStarl
DirecTV merger.
Question 2: Mr. Pitofsky, there is no doubt that consumers are upset-and rightfullY. so-by the seeming unending increases in the price of cable TV. EchoStar and
DIRECTV ctaim that, by permitting them to bring local· into-local service into many
more markets, this merger will greatly strengthen [satellite] as a competitor to cable
and, in turn, restrain cable rates. What's your view of this issue? Won't this merger
make satellite TV a much stronger competitor to cable, and therefore much better
able restrain cable rate increases?
Answer: It is hard to see why any of the alleged advantages of the merger could
not be achieved by each of these companies separately-continuing to compete vigorously with each other. 1!:xperience suggests that where there is a three·to·two merger, the result will be to raise the price of the two smaller companies rather than
_ lower the price of the dominant market leader.

Responses of Robert Pitofsky to questions submitted by Senator Orrin G.
Hatch
Question 1: Attorney General Nixon, Mr. Fritts, and Mr. Pitofsky, would each of
you please explain your respective interpretations of the recent announcement by
DirecTV and EchoStar that they have suddenly found sufficient spectrum to carry
all stations in all 210 television markets?
_4nswer: Of course it would be a welcome development if the DBS providers would
provide local-into· local service to all consumers throughout the country. But the bur·
den is on the merging parties to make a showing that the merger will result in effie
ciencies that are not achievable by each company independently, and that any efficiencies outweigh the concerns about extreme increased concentration. I have yet to
Bee any persuasive evidence that these companies will not get to full local-into-Iocal
service on their own. Their essential argument appears to be that they would make
more money if they didn't have to compete with each other, and that is a reason
to allow the merger. That certainly is not a theory that results in consumer benefits.
Question 2: Attorney General Nixon and Mr. Pitofskr, let me ask you both a ques·
tion that touches on a couple of different antitrust pnnciples. There has been some
debate about what the relevant market is and whether choosing' one market over
another really makes a substantive difference in this case. I would note for example, that EchoStar has taken the jlosition in litigation against DirecTV that DBS
IS the relevant market and that DirecTV is a monopoly in that market, but has
more recently adopted a different and broader market definition. Also, one argument offered in support of the merger is that better competition to cable in the more
urban areas, as well as more local television and par-per-view offerings' by the
merged company, justify elimination of satellite televiSIOn and broadband competi·
tion nationwide. MoreoverbMr. Kimmelman admitted that your analyses of the antitrust issues were correct, ut that a broader view of some sort was required in this
case, while attempting to argue that while DBS and cable were separate markets
now, they would somehow become one market if the merger were approved. Could
you comment in detail on these issues, including the relevant market definition and
the nature of competition between cable and DBS, and, finally, give us your views
of whether the antitrust laws allow benefits in one geographical or product market
to be traded off against harm in another such market?
Answer: Let's examine the relevant market question from two points of view. AB
to the relevant geographic market, it is clear that the market is local. AB a result
of the merger, many subscribers and potential subscribers in rural America who do
not have access to cable will see their choices reduced from two to one-two satellite
companies merged to one. That surely is an ominous development for consumers.
As to relevant product market, I have not done the extensive study necessary to
reach a finn conclusion. I tend to agree with the position advanced by EchoStar in
the brief it filed about a year and a half ago that the two DBS companies compete
most directly and substantially with each other and their prices respond to each
other rather than to cable. That would make DBS a separate market or a submarket and again the merger would result in monopoly. Another possibility is that
DBS to some extent competes with cable 80 that the three are in the same relevant
product market. Even in that situation, the merger reduces the-relevantllayers
from three to two, a level of concentration that has invariably been rejecte in the
courts.
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Finally, you raised the question of whether anticompetitive effects in one section
of the country can be justified by purpgrted improvements in competition in another
section. The answer is absolutely not. The relevant statute--Section 7 of the Cla~n
Act-is clear on the point. It says that a merger that lessens competition in any
section of the countrY" is illegal, and the courts have followed that plain meaning
of the statute ever since it was amended in 1950.
.'
Questfun 3: It was reported in the Wall Street Journal on February e [thjat-rillht
up to the time at which the merger agreement was signed-EchoStar and DireCl'V
had been exploring ways to- achieve these same spectrum efficiencies through a joint
venture, but that effort failed due to control and economic factors. I would be inter- 8ted in Mr. Ergen's and Mr. Hartenstein's elaboration on why such a joint venture
is not a feasible alternative to this merger, and in Mr. Pitofsky's and [Attorney)
General Nixon's analysis of that alternative. Could you both please provide a detailed explanation of the reasons that a joint venture is not a feasible alternative?
Answer: I am not familiar with the details of possible arrangements to serve consumers of satellite services through a joint venture. Often, a joint venture is a less
restrictive alternative to a merger and can be equally efficient; I don't know if that
is a possibility here.
Question 4: Attorney General Nixon and Mr. Pitofsky, I have heard that sensitive
competitive information, such as specific programming contract terms, may have
been disclosed by DirecTV to EchoStar in a manner that is not traditionally part
of the nonnal due diligence process of a merger. I have also heard that some
DirecTV customers have been contacted about needing to switch to EchoStar now,
in advance of merger approval, to keep uninterrupted television service, reportedly
by postcard, phone, and advertisement. Mr. Nixon and Mr. Pitofsky would either
of these actiVIties, if true, raise concerns in the minds of antitrust enforcers as they
review this mer~er?
Answer: It is ImFrtant that parties, in the period leading up to merger approval,
not "jump the gun and exchange competitively sensitive information not reasonably
necessary to negotiations. They should, of course, continue to compete until the proposed merger is approved. I have no independent information as to whether inappropriate actions occurred between EchoStar and DirecTV in negotiations leading
up to the announcement of their proposed merger.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Statement of Kirk Kirkpatrick. President and Chief Executive Officer, MDS
.
America, Incorporated, Stuart, Florida
Mr. Chairman, Senator DeWine, and members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for givinjf me this opportunity to submit written testimony as part of
the official record of this important hearing examining the proposed merger between
EchoStar and DirecTV.
My name is Kirk Kirkpatrick and I am the r.resident and chief executive officer
of MDS America, Incorporated ("MDS America'), a company headquartered in Stuart, Florida. MDS America is the North American licensee of MDS International,
a company based in Lyon, France, that is the leading designer and manufacturer
of terrestrial broadband transmission equipment in the 12.2 to 12.7 GHz band (the
"DBS band"). MDS terrestrial systems utihze a wireless technology capable of transmitting video and high-speed Internet data in the DBS band, without causing harmful interference to satellite services operating at the same frequencies.
MDS International has been develoying wireless terrestrial broadcast systems
since 1986 and sold its first commercia system to the V.S. Government in 1997 to
provide AFRTS for American military personnel in Oman. In the intervening time,
It has deployed many of these. systems worldwide in locations such as France,
Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Gabon, New Zealand, and Greenland. Some of thePrilstems share frequencies with DBS services in their areas. Most recently, the
of
the United Arab Emirates awarded MDS International a pilot system toward a
multi-million dollar contract to deploy a 300-hundred channel terrestrial system
that will broadcast video programmmg throughout the seven emirates of the V.A.E.
Having achieved a track record of success overseas, MDS International, through
its North American licensee MDS America, would now like to participate in the
emerging U.S. market for fixed terrestrial wireless services. The prospect that DBS
terrestri8.l spectnun-sharing will become a reality here in the United States is an
exciting development: Spectrum sharing should Increase competition in the multi-

